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This is a book about the complex relations and entanglements of countries in Russia’s 
neighborhood from the perspective of strategic culture. The Eastern European and the 
Eurasian space went through a dramatic transformation over the past decades, since the 
collapse of the communist system and the end of the Cold War. The countries that belonged 
to the Soviet Block were free to re-evaluate their societal organization, political line and 
international alliances. The enlargement of Western institutions to territories that were 
considered previously a Soviet sphere of influence altered the Cold War’s East-West balance 
of great power politics. 14 independent states, in addition to the Russian Federation, emerged 
in the space of the former Soviet Union – all of which started to develop own policies and 
make independent strategic choices. The fall of Soviet Union affected also the Nordic 
countries enabling their regional cooperation as well as new institutional memberships. Even 
if Nordic countries did not belong to the Soviet Block, they were influenced by the closeness 
of the Soviet Union and the Cold War environment restricted their actions. This was 
especially the case in relation to Finland. 
 
Russian foreign policy, however, has not always shown adaptability to these fundamental 
changes and was keen to maintain continuity in its relationship with its neighborhood based 
on principles of great power politics. Due to these continuities in perceptions, behavior 
patterns and political culture, Russian foreign policy attitudes have been accordingly tailored 
to different regions and sometimes differently to individual countries within the same region – 
a vital aspect that academic research has often neglected.  
  
For the countries in Russia’s neighborhood, historical experiences have influenced foreign 
policy decisions, as well. Russia, nevertheless, has not been perceived solely as a security 
hazard but from a far more complex perspective of potential and mutual advantages, based on 
manifold interdependences. The national perceptions and policies regarding Russia have been 
strongly rooted in the countries’ traditions, histories, experiences and political culture – in 
other words in their strategic culture. This aspect, it could be argued, has been overlooked 
both in Russia and in the Western countries. A deeper understanding of small and medium 
size countries in between Russia and the West should be developed in today’s world politics, 
where conflict and competition are increasing and alliances are renegotiated.  
 
 
Changing Spatiality of Security Conceptions 
 
The spatial context is particularly relevant in this volume because we are dealing with a 
special European in-between area where Russian and Western interests have clashed over 
centuries – and this circumstance affects the manoeuvring of the countries in this region. Still, 
looking at the area from the outside, many tend to think that whenever the power balance 
between Russia and the West changed it inevitably modified also the strategic thinking in 
these countries. The most common misperception is that the post-communist transformation 
self-evidently brought about a profound change in strategic culture. This volume’s starting 
point is that there are deeper continuities of attitudes, conceptions and behaviour patterns that 
survived the collapse of the communist system because their roots reach far back in history. 
Consequently, the integration of post-communist countries in the late 1990s and 2000s to 
NATO and EU1 did not represent a dramatic turn, as it has often been presented. This 
assumption invites us to dig deeper into the concept of strategic culture and investigate how 
strategic culture evolves over history and what factors contribute to it. This volume will 
analyse Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, as well as regional entities, Black Sea countries, the Baltic 
States, Nordic countries and Visegrad-members, from the four aspects of strategic culture: 
military security, economic relations and energy dependence, and identity. 
 
One of the most enduring aspects of strategic culture, relating to small and medium size 
countries in the in-between area is being a security consumer. This applies especially to those 
countries that are members of NATO and previously were members of the Warsaw Pact, 
during the Cold War. Being a security consumer has a peculiar advantage. Integration to a 
security organization, such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, gave elbowroom to turn to other, 
nationally perhaps even more important, strategic goals when the immediate military security 
worries were solved by the membership. There are also countries in this volume that differ in 
this respect; Finland, Sweden and Serbia, that were militarily non-allied during and after the 
Cold War. 
 
The Economic ties and energy issues have also been one of the most discussed topics. In the 
1990s, perhaps the golden era of liberal institutionalism, interdependence was assumed to 
bring integration and a feeling of inclusiveness. The EU enlargement was an example of 
economic integration. The accession has benefited the “new” Eastern members, in absolute 
terms, receiving considerable structural support aiming to decrease the gap between Eastern 
and Western standards of living. Thus, national strategies have been centered around a wider 
security conception reflecting on preserving political and societal stability by ensuring 
economic prosperity and energy supply. Hence, the EU was seen accordingly as a non-
military security provider institution. These advantages of the EU were propagated also to the 
Eastern neighborhood countries, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, aiming to strengthen 
their Western orientation and counter-balance Russian influence. The EU was, however, 
unable to establish a deeper value-based socialization of the new member countries. Several 
Eastern members have started to show signs of reverse evolution, the weakening of the rule of 
law, an increasing centralization of power, attacks against the freedom of judiciary, a 
diminishing elbowroom of media and civil society. These developments have shown that 
economic integration and interdependence do not always translate into societal and political 
convergence, and hence new barriers and dividing lines have re-emerged in Europe. 
 
Identity does not always respect man made borders negotiated and sealed with agreements. 
During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain did not prevent East-West multilevel interactions.2 
Especially countries that are positioned in-between two clearly different entities are 
challenged every time when international political dynamics change. It also means that the 
special in-between position of all countries presented in this volume is subject to pendulum-
like swings between the bipolar magnetism of divergent Eastern and Western models, and this 
affects the evolution of strategic culture. 
 
In-between-ness is a multidimensional concept, not limited to countries between Russia and 
the West. In geography, Russia is a large country penetrating deep into both Europe and Asia, 
placing Russia geopolitically in between Europe and Asia. 3 Russia’s position in Europe has 
always been difficult and caused more conflict than cooperation with the other European 
countries. Russia’s choices and drastic changes from authoritarian tsarism to socialism, and 
then to a political limbo between democracy and authoritarianism – was seen on several 
occasions as a security hazard from European perspectives. Furthermore, these political 
transformations were perceived as ‘non-European’ solutions. Russia also has a biased relation 
to Europe and the West, based on an identity dilemma that has affected the nature of the 
foreign policy of Russia since the 19th and early 20th century. In the case of Russian security 
perceptions, economics especially in energy issues as well as in identity and cultural ties have 
affected its strategic culture and debates inside of Russia. In these debates three main lines 
emerged competing for the leading place defining the foreign policy establishment.4 
 
Russian statists, resembling the Western realist thinking, believe that foreign policy should be 
guided by national interests defined realistically with regard to the geopolitical security 
situation, domestic economic objectives and available resources. The statists claim that Russia 
has been, is and will be a great power with global outreach, in the same category with China 
and the United States. In the world of great power competition there is little room for 
independent foreign policy for smaller states that are seen as pawns on the chess board 
situated in the spheres of interest. It can be argued that the statists are the most influential 
group in current Russian foreign policy. 
 
For the Russian liberal school, the Westernizers (zapadniki), Russia needs to become a 
modern state in the Western style because the West represents the most viable and progressive 
civilisation in the world. For the Westernizers Europe is the civilizational reference point. 
They place Russia as part of Europe and the European norm and value system, and expect a 
proper integration into European and Western institutions. For Westernizers the ideas of 
multilateralism and international cooperation are essential elements of international politics. 
This group has been the most disappointed in the way Russia’s relationships with rest of 
Europe and other Western states have developed, too often blaming the deteriorating relations 
on the West. 
 
The last group, the civilizationists (or nationalists)5 see the international environment as 
hostile where the West is a threat to Russian values. Foreign policy should reflect Russian 
civilizational uniqueness and the idea of the ‘Russian Empire’ of Slavic and orthodox unity. 
They object to both Western and Asian influence, placing Russia firmly in-between the East 
and the West. This group has difficulties in drawing a line between Russia and the West, 
which blurs the picture of what is Russian civilization. However, despite the blurriness, this 
group can be seen as very influential when it comes to the Russian neighbourhood, since its 
arguments are based on identity, historical memory and cultural ties. 
 
These Russian strategic cultural groups highlight also the complexities rising from inside of 
Russia affecting, in different ways in different times, Russia’s relationship with its 
neighbours. This has relevance in how the countries in the Russian neighbourhood define 
their security risks, understand threats and how their strategic culture evolves. 
 
 
Theoretical Building Blocks 
 
This book elaborates the concept of strategic culture and therefore we want to address some 
central theoretical debates that we found particularly useful for developing our approach. It is 
fascinating how much the evolution of theory was actually indebted to the Cold War 
juxtaposition. The bipolarity of the superpowers crucially downplayed the relevance of 
national aspects relating to cooperation, competition, conflict and war. The “national 
character” of the enemy played an important role in the public discourses until the end of the 
Second World War.6 The conceptual change was partly due to nuclear weapons that 
supposedly would make great powers behave similarly and the possibility of mass destruction 
made cultural differences irrelevant.7 Furthermore, during the Cold War the rational-actor 
theories of strategic behavior dominated the security studies. 
 
Amongst several scholars, Colin S Gray, however, cautioned already in 1971 that it would be 
a mistake and create a dangerous illusion of safety to treat Soviet threat perceptions and 
decision-making processes as analogues to US threat perceptions and decision-making.8 Jack 
Snyder introduced the notion of strategic culture in 1977 and defined it as ‘the sum total of 
ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of 
the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share 
with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy’.9 Snyder established his ideas on the 
concept of political culture, which was developed by Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney 
Verba in the 1960s. Political culture contained shared experiences and common memories, 
rooted in nationally anchored religion, customs, language and history, all of which provided a 
framework for decision making.10 
 
Since Snyder’s work, three generations of theorists emerged disputing the role of culture in 
security policy and strategic behavior. The emblematic controversy, known as the ‘Gray and 
Johnston debate’, was carried out between the first and second generations of scholars of 
security. 11 The first, influenced by the cultural turn of social sciences, presented a holistic 
and determinist position claiming that since all politics take place within the realm of culture 
every nation produces inevitably culture-specific strategic decisions. This approach was 
contested for its semi-permanent, homogenizing and essentialist perspective of national 
culture. The second generation of scholars advocated a limited role of culture in political 
decision-making, distinguishing between culturally-anchored decisions and rational choices. 
These views were criticized because of the positivist effort to demarcate the cultural 
component off from ‘normal’ or ‘rational’ behavior in strategic decisions. The third 
generation mediated between the first two by introducing the significance of institutions and 
organizations which are culturally embedded and prone to continuity, thus having profound 
effect on the practice of policy-making.12 These ideas were questioned by linking ‘culture’ to 
institutions.13 Furthermore similar developments occurred inside the neo-realist school. As 
John Glenn has observed “The mid-nineties witnessed the emergence of a new school of 
realists that sought to move beyond the basic insights of Waltzian neorealism by investigating 
the interaction of systemic pressures and domestic processes in the foreign policy decision 
making process, thus providing a much richer explanatory account of why states choose 
certain foreign policies over others”.14 
 
These theoretical stepping stones provide an important wider framework but we need to 
pinpoint also the more direct building blocks of our theoretical undertaking. We agree with 
Stuart Poore that non-cultural or material variables become meaningful for security 
considerations only through culture that conditions understanding.15 Ann Swindler’s work 
reminded that culture can be understood as a warehouse providing a great variety of means 
for decision-makers to choose and determine their policies – thus culture offers the means but 
not the ends of strategic policy.16 According to Kerry Longhurst, strategic culture is shaped 
by formative experiences which can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical 
junctures.17 Equally important was the point made by Keohane, Katzenstein and Krasner that 
strategic behavior always reveals its underlying intersubjective nature – based on mutually 
created identities and shared meanings.18 
 
Alan Bloomfield suggested that strategic culture contained multiple co-existing strategic 
subcultures. Each subculture presents a different interpretation of a state’s international 
social/cultural context – who are a state’s friends and foes, and what exactly are the material 
variables relevant to strategic decision-making – geography, relative power, technological 
change etc.19. Bloomfield notes that the sub-groups “exist in changeable relations of 
dominance, subordination and latency relative to each other”20. This relationship between the 
groups can explain changes in a particular country’s foreign policy while some underlying 
features are maintained. For this volume two points in Bloomfield’s interpretation are 
especially important: historical threat perceptions play a significant role in the strategic 
decision-making process when it comes to choosing whom to trust and whom to fear, and the 
different sub-groups use a mix of social/cultural and material/technical factors to compete 
with each other to offer the ‘most accurate’ interpretation of the state’s international context21. 
The ideas mentioned above were vital for developing our own theoretical approach to analyze 
strategic culture.  
 
 
In-between Strategic Culture: towards a New Approach 
 
In this book, we focus on a very special regional phenomenon deriving from geopolitical in-
between-ness. The geographical position in between two ideologically, politically or 
economically divergent great entities (like East–West, communism–capitalism, democracy–
authoritarianism) affects a state’s security considerations and policy perspectives. The 
concept of in-between-ness in itself is not new: already in 1919 Sir Harold Mackinder 
proposed a supranational state, Europe in-between, which would serve as a strong buffer zone 
between Germany and Russia. Mackinder’s “supranational” state area consisted of the Baltic 
states, Poland, Great Bohemia, Great Romania, Great Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Greece.22 Mackinder’s buffers are very much in line also with this book’s geographical area. 
As Sami Moisio has observed, “‘Europe in-between’ gained its geopolitical relevance during 
an era of inter-imperial rivalry from 1875 to 1945. This rivalry was primarily about the 
occupation of territories, for economic success and the future of a particular state were seen 
to be based on fixed territorial resources and the geographical extent of the territory.”23 
Especially that period of history has been central in shaping the strategic culture of the 
countries in this volume. Nevertheless, current political analyses have often overlooked the 
multiple layers of historical influences that can be traced back even centuries. 
 
In geopolitical literature, the countries of the in-between are most commonly referred to as 
buffer zone entities indicating that they carry a particular weight (military security, political or 
economic value) for outside powers. More precisely, a ‘buffer’ means a space in between two 
antagonist poles, where at least one of them considers that area to be of primary importance 
for its strategic interests. This often creates a basis for competition where the other pole is 
likely to challenge this claim over the territory. Buffer zone thinking is closely related to the 
phenomenon of the sphere of influence, which expands the concept of security to various 
other fields, from economy to societal development and culture. The purpose of the sphere of 
influence is to strengthen and deepen an area’s buffer potential by accommodating its values, 
political system, social and economic structures with the power that exercises it. Being 
subjected to a buffer zone or sphere of influence inevitably creates a security concern for the 
countries in the in-between space. 
 
The fluctuation between the different poles is reflected in the concept of strategic culture, 
relying on the warehouse of various versions of ‘meaningful’ history. Interpretations of the 
past serve not only as argumentative means for intended policy but also provide a mental map 
to how security is traditionally conceived and identity constructed. Hence, there are some core 
national images and narratives relating to in-between-ness that acquire a central place in 
strategic discourse. Therefore, we are trying to answer the key questions of this book: in what 
forms in-between regionality affects the countries’ strategic culture and in what respect 
countries diverge from this common experience? 
 
Furthermore, the seemingly stable historical images actually represent continuous change 
because historical understanding is always dependent on its own temporal socio-political 
context. Thus, the same historical event inevitably gets a new ‘reading’ in every usage. From 
this perspective, the volume also asks when and how security actors decide to change the set 
of ‘traditional’ history images from their warehouse, and what are the drivers of this change? 
 
 
Countries in the Russian Neighborhood 
 
This volume provides an angle of Russia’s European neighboring regions and countries. In all 
cases regional in between-ness can be detected in the individual countries’ strategic culture. 
The focus is on describing and analyzing the broader trends of change and continuity 
especially in relation to Russia. The studies in this book bring light on the regional aspects of 
historical experiences, pragmatic strategies, security perceptions and their impact on the 
countries’ attitudes towards Russia. We also discuss the complex interrelatedness of domestic 
and foreign political power-play vis-à-vis Russia. By doing so the volume will also shed light 
on current developments in Europe and perhaps even help towards a better understanding of 
integration processes as well as Russia’s role in these complex relations. 
 
All the chapters dealing with different country-cases and sub-regions elaborate, as their 
common prism of investigation, the multiple interdependences between security perceptions, 
economic development considerations and identity-formulations. Depending on the country 
and region one element might be more dominant than the others. We understand all of these 
elements as fluid and ever-changing constructions – subjects of constant debates of strategic 
subcultures. These factors are also deeply intertwined and precondition each other. The 
contributions of this volume discuss the notion of security in its wider definition comprising 
also an overall conception of societal security of the national and regional space. Economic 
relations, and particularly resource and energy dependence have an important relevance on 
how countries are exposed to power centers. Identity construction is the most fundamental 
component affecting national strategic culture. Identity has an impact on how security is 
perceived in the temporal and spatial context and reflects also the pragmatic realities of 
development scenarios. 
 
We pinpoint the complex mutual game where Russia is trying to influence how the states 
formulate their foreign policy but also domestic choices, and how, on the other hand, the 
countries’ elites deploy the Russian card in their own infighting for power or make regional 
alliances. In addition, the interdependence of the countries within the different regions in 
connection to common positioning to Russia, and the regions as entities’ relation with Russia 
is discussed in depth. 
 
The book is comprised of four parts. In the first section Jeremy Smith presents the different 
dimensions of Russian strategic culture. He argues that the notion of responsibility has shaped 
Russian strategic culture towards the countries within its immediate neighborhood and 
beyond. The use of the idea of responsibility has varied and sometimes extended to particular 
national groups as ethnic Russians, adherents of the Orthodox religion, or to particular 
territories, such as the countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, Russian strategic 
culture is affected by regional differences based on the geographical location of neighboring 
countries to the West, South, or East. Furthermore, regions are associated with comparative 
developmental status, seen as advanced, backwards, or similar to the level of Russia. These 
different dimensions of strategic culture bear relevance on the variations of Russian 
neighborhood policy towards different regions and countries. 
 
In the second section the volume focuses on the Nordic and Central European region, starting 
with Hanna Smith’s article that looks at the four Nordic countries; Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden from a historical perspective, tracing strategic culture changes and continuities 
far back in history. The four countries have very different security arrangements and policies, 
however there are similarities in relation to Russia and although different formats, also in the 
identity of in-between-ness. These two elements have enhanced, maintained and shaped the 
Nordic regional identity. 
 
From Nordic countries the next step is the Baltic states. Kristīne Atmante-Berge, Riina 
Kaljurand and Tomas Jermalavičius map the different historical periods that have resulted in 
two important concepts in today’s strategic culture in all three Baltic states; “never again” and 
“never alone”. They then examine how the two external shocks; the war in Georgia 2008 and 
the annexation of Crimea followed by the war in Eastern Ukraine altered Lithuanian and 
Latvian strategic cultures in particular. The chapter highlights the differences of the three 
Baltic states in their strategic cultures even if all of them share the main and dominant 
security concern; the Russian Federation. 
 
The second section is concluded with Katalin Miklóssy’s and Justyna Pierzynska’s chapter 
that elaborates two cases of the Visegrad alliance, Hungary and Poland. They distinguish 
between long-term strategic culture and short-term strategic behavior, and claim that common 
responses to shared historical challenges are due to the similar limitation of the geopolitical 
space and the resembling modus operandi. Divergences originated from the different means 
applied because the countries were dissimilarly furnished with resources, and had some 
special national agendas. Miklossy and Pierzynska argue that space and modus operandi are 
characteristically long-term elements of strategic culture whereas means are typically related 
to short-term strategic behaviour. 
  
The third part looks at the Black Sea region. Katalin Miklóssy and Silviu Miloiu start the 
section by analyzing the interlinked-ness of Romanian and Moldovan strategic culture that in 
both states evolved historically around the concept of the ideal state, and in which Russia 
played a significant role. The idea of the ideal state is grounded in clashing national identities 
and constitutes national consensus. To achieve this paramount national goal, both countries’ 
elites take advantage of the in-between position and actively use both the Russian and EU 
cards in domestic, regional and international strategies. 
 
Then Dragomir Stoyanov looks at the temporal dimension of Bulgarian strategic culture and 
argues that the persistence of the opposition between pro-West or pro-Russia groups is not an 
anachronism carried over from 19th century, but rather an actual dilemma conditioned by 
Bulgaria’s position in the regional balance of power. The chapter goes through shifts in 
Bulgarian strategic culture with historical examples and analyses the current situation through 
political parties’ positions towards NATO and the EU. The chapter identifies four subcultures 
within Bulgarian strategic culture: pro-Western, pro-Russian, and pro-Turkish, and the 
subculture of pragmatic balancers that all need to be understood if one seeks to understand 
Bulgaria’s foreign and security policy choices. 
 
The third section is concluded by Toni Alaranta’s analysis of Turkey’s two competing 
strategic culture paradigms, representing complex relationships with the West and Russia. 
The Kemalist Republican paradigm has been built around domestic westernization and 
Western-oriented foreign policy. In contrast, the imperial strategic culture, defined as 
“Eurasianism” is primarily a cultural-civilizational doctrine seeking regional power positions 
for Turkey. Alaranta claims that while in both paradigms there is a special place on how to 
come to terms with Russia, the Erdogan-era is driving the Eurasianist agenda and strategic 
cooperation with Russia even at the expense of confrontation with the West. 
 
The fourth and last part examines the countries that could be counted in as Slavic 
Brotherhood countries, displaying assumedly a special traditional affinity to Russian interests. 
Milan Subotic and Milan Igrutinovic state that Serbia’s strategic culture has been dominated 
by two incompatible orientations: Russian–Serbian closeness, based on historical experience 
of war alliances, cultural kinship and shared orthodox religion, represents an important 
segment of Serbian identity discourse. This is now tested by the country’s EU-drive and 
implemented Europeanisation policy. The half-hearted EU interest in Serbia’s accession, 
however, reinforces the mythologization of Slavic brotherhood and anti-Western sentiment, 
which is assisted by an active Russian policy in the region. 
 
The countries of Slavic Brotherhood also encompass Ukraine that has perhaps experienced 
the most profound changes of all the countries in this book. Mark Teremae tries to trace 
Ukrainian strategic culture in the time of the internal turmoil as well as uncertainty of how the 
relationship with Russia will turn out in the future. Even if contemporary relations with 
Russia are very constrained, the part of Ukrainian strategic culture that has argued for 
dialogue with Russia, remains influential. Teremae argues that as long as Ukrainian domestic 
and foreign policy wavers depending on which subculture is ascendant in a kind of zero-sum 
game, the country will experience instability. 
 
In the last part of the fourth section Matthew Frear looks at Belarus that has been variously 
portrayed as a ‘denationalized nation’ or a ‘semi-sovereign state’. However, when looking 
closely Belarusian strategic culture emerges in different formats. Minsk has attempted to play 
the role of a ‘free radical’ that is not just attached to one centre of power. At the same time, it 
engages in ‘strategic hedging’ between various powers, with the aim of pursuing a path of 
‘sovereignty entrepreneurship’ to monetize geopolitical loyalty for maximum benefit. In 
doing so, foreign-policy decision making in Belarus has drawn from a more diverse range of 
potentially contradictory narratives and traditions. During the Lukashenka presidency, 
relations with Moscow and the wider world in the context of strategic culture have been 
involving and adapting. Belarusian strategic culture has expanded to appropriate a wider 
range of subcultures. However, it remains to be seen how long Belarus can play the game of 
drawing on at times contradictory strategic cultures to meet short-term needs.  
 
All of the chapters address the importance of history, security perceptions and in-between-
ness as part of strategic culture. Bloomfield’s argument relating to strategic culture sub-
cultures comes through in all chapters. Through the prism of strategic culture, the volume also 
sheds light on the bases of strategic decisions of the countries in Russia’s neighborhood and 
the role of Russia in particular. A complex and nuanced picture emerges that clearly shows 
how important it is to understand each country’s strategic culture first and foremost. Only by 
looking from the inside towards the outside, not from outside in, we can learn and understand 
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